1. Field of Invention
The present invention relates to the field of electronic monitoring of gasoline storage tank contents at a gas station.
2. Description of Related Art
Electronic tank gauges for fuel tanks at filling stations, such as those manufactured by VEEDER ROOT are typically monitored locally by viewing the display on the gauge, printing using a gauge mounted printer, or via a local computer connected to the gauge via a serial cable, or remotely using a remote computer via a telephone line and modem at both sides, or remotely using a remote computer via the Internet using a TCP/IP connection. In all cases where a computer is used, a polling type protocol is used to request information or make configurations changes. Polling is always initiated by the computer. Polling requires both a static IP address and, if the tank gauge is not directly connected to the Internet, as in most cases, routing of messages received at the static IP address to the tank gauge's internal IP address (port forwarding) must be performed by the location's router. Remote locations, such as gas stations and convenience stores, typically have simple residential-type Internet service often lacking a fixed or static IP address. In addition, the router is often poorly maintained and the required port forwarding configuration is often lost. Also, although the routers used with this type of Internet service can provide some security against cyber-attacks, configuring the security measures is complex and difficult to maintain. These routers are often replaced causing loss of configuration settings and these routers can be compromised. The electronic tank gauges, by virtue of having to be polled require an IP address, typically an internal IP address on the filling station's Local Area Network. The proprietary communications protocols developed and used by the tank gauge manufacturers were originally developed for serial communications over directly wired serial connections or via point to point telephone modem connections. As such these protocols provide minimal security because the optional password is limited to 6 characters, the password is visible as plain text and there is no timeout protection against computer based password cracking tools. The communications protocols' protection features are of little value in protecting against unauthorized access to the tank gauges when they are polled over the Internet. Tank gauges that are protected by routers and other security devices at the gauge's location may be attacked through the remote computers that are legitimately polling the tank gauges and who are authorized to pass through the routers and security devices. Viruses in these polling computers or even on computers on the same network as the polling computers, are undetectable unless active, have access to the lists of filling station static IP addresses, run on computers authorized to communicate with the tank gauges, and can send commands to the tank gauges while assuming the disguise of the actual polling software. A limited number of polling computers poll the majority of Internet connected gauges creating a small target for maximum damage. The polling computers cannot effect common protection such as encryption and selective command blocking due to the constraints of the communications protocols. The communications protocols, by their design, support both requests for information and commands to change settings in the tank gauge. A cyber-attack on an unprotected tank gauge or a virus on a polling computer can issue commands that can disable the gauge, cause incorrect readings in the tank gauge, create spurious alarms, disable critical alarms, delete tank gauge configuration, delete archive copies of configuration, change clock settings and more. Any command supported by the protocol can be issued. These commands can cause disruption to filling station business, cause EPA fines for incorrect release detection reporting, cause spills, cause maintenance costs and more. As commands are not logged in the tank gauges, a cyber-attack that makes changes, then reverses them at a later time may cause multiple expensive service calls because the problems come and go and are never resolved. Communication with the gauges over the Internet using polling over TCP/IP is expensive in terms of setup, equipment and especially maintaining the router configuration settings for port forwarding and security.
Devices are found in the art that relate to communications systems for storage tank monitors. Some prior art devices provide a retrofit filling station communication system that includes a remote communication adapter operatively connected to existing underground wiring, wherein the device is associated with POS functionality to monitor fuel levels. Other devices provide a high accuracy MEMS mass flow meter compatible with conventional variable area flow meters, wherein the device is equipped with a standard RS485 for remote management. These prior art systems and methods, however, fail to provide a secure, remote communication for gas stations by upgrading existing gauges that are able to monitor fuel supply, in real-time, to provide the most updated information from a variety of instruments.
Therefore, there exists a need for a system and method that provides a secure, remote communication means for filling stations for fuel tank gauges and other device monitoring and management.